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Quality of social care, and how staff impact on the quality of social care provision, are critical policy themes 
internationally (Wanless et al., 2006; Department of Health, 2010, Department of Health, 2012; Skills for 
Care, 2014; Colombo and Muir, 2016). Generally, the level of quality in social care in England is well 
maintained and regulated, but this does not prevent there being high-profile examples of cases of abuse 
(Cavendish, 2013). Local authorities (LAs) in England are tasked by the Care Act 2014 to shape social care 
markets in which the continuous improvement of quality is encouraged and where the workforce is able to 
deliver high quality services. As such, staffing is as an important aspect of social care that is likely to impact 
on the quality of service provided. However, despite this, there is little quantitative evidence for England as 
to the importance of staff in quality provision within social care.   
Social care in general, including care homes, is a highly labour-intensive industry. Currently the UK care 
home sector has relatively high levels of staff turnover and vacancy rates (Skills for Care, 2015) and there is 
a potential future workforce shortage (ILC-UK, 2015). Lower fees and employee turnover are putting 
pressure on care homes so that they are only meeting basic needs and have problems in investing in staff 
training (National Audit Office, 2014).  
The, predominantly US, evidence has generally found that poor workforce characteristics have a significant 
negative effect on quality indicators (Bostick et al., 2006; Spilsbury et al., 2011). The evidence as to the 
impact of staffing on social care quality in England/UK is generally descriptive. For example, Hussein et al. 
(2016) examine vacancy and turnover rates in different forms of social care from 2008-2010 and find that 
there are persistent levels of employee turnover and vacancies in social care which are much higher than 
national averages. A Royal College of Nursing (2012) report of a survey of nurses working in care homes 
highlighted that (low) staffing levels and poor skill mix impacted on the level of quality.  
This paper seeks to add to the existing evidence for England by providing an empirical analysis of the 
impact of firm-level workforce composition on the quality of English care homes. We hypothesise that 
better work conditions (e.g. lower staff turnover, fewer temporary workers) will lead to higher quality in 
care homes. Specifically, we measure care quality using the quality ratings of the Care Quality Commission 
(CQC), the national health and social care regulator, and control for care home characteristics and local 
area supply, demand and need characteristics. We also control for the potential endogenous relationship 
between care home quality, and both competition and the workforce composition measures. 
Section 2 of the paper presents the background of the care homes market, in terms of both the supply and 
demand for places and the regulation of the market. Section 3 develops the conceptual framework for the 
analysis, whilst section 4 describes the empirical specification and the data. Section 5 presents the results, 
with a discussion following in section 6.  
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2. The English Care Homes Market 
The English care homes market for the elderly is composed of just over 9,500 care homes aimed primarily 
at those who live with dementia or the general population of older people. Much of the supply comprises 
of single home providers or small multi-home organisations, although there are some large chains. Around 
15% of the market is supplied by non-profit providers (Forder and Allan, 2011).  
Demand for care home places comes from two main groups, first, publicly-supported residents where 
services are commissioned by public authorities (local councils) on behalf of service users, and second, self-
payers (those who do not qualify for public support). Self-payers make up around 40-45% of demand and, 
other than a small proportion of placements made by the National Health Service (around 8%, which are 
without charge to the resident), the remaining placements are made by commissioners in local councils. 
The self-pay market can be regarded mostly as a conventional market, although all homes, regardless of 
payer, are required to meet quality standards (see below). The publicly-supported market is a quasi-market 
(Bartlett et al., 1994). Self-payers have more freedom to choose homes at their preferred price-
location/type-quality point, but it is worth noting that most homes currently operate with a mix of self-pay 
and local authority residents, with an increasing minority now focussing on self-payers only (Laing & 
Buisson, 2014).   
As is seen between public (Medicaid) and private payers in the US nursing home market (Grabowski 2004, 
Mukamel and Spector, 2002), local authorities appear to have some market power as suggested by the 
discounts they apparently secure compared to self-pay rates (Office of Fair Trading, 2005; Laing & Buisson, 
2014).  
Regulation 
Care homes are regulated by the Care Quality Commission (CQC), the health and social care regulator for 
England. Care homes are regulated as to their quality according to their compliance with both the Health 
and Social Care Act 2008 (Regulated Activities) Regulations 2014 and the Care Quality Commission 
(Registration) Regulations 2009. The former (from herein the Regulations) deals with the requirements for 
owners and managers of providers and the fundamental standards which providers must adhere to and not 
fall below. The latter deals with factors relating to the registration of providers, including the financial 
position of the provider and statement of purpose (Care Quality Commission, 2015b).  
The fundamental standards in the Regulations include no specific requirements as to the number of staff or 
ratio of skill mix required in English care homes. In particular, Regulation 18 of the Regulations outlines the 
fundamental standards for staffing and states that:  
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 ?[s]ufficient numbers of suitably qualified, competent, skilled and experienced persons must be deployed in 
ŽƌĚĞƌƚŽŵĞĞƚƚŚĞƌĞƋƵŝƌĞŵĞŶƚƐ ? ? ? ?.  
The Regulations further detail that all staff employed by registered providers must receive training and 
support to be able to carry out their duties, and be able to further their qualifications in the role they work. 
In practice, care homes must have a clear plan as to the staffing levels/mix that are present in their care 
home.  
The CQC monitors the performance of providers through local feedback, information gathered from both 
the provider and national sources, and the inspection and rating of services. Inspections are based around 
five key questions that ask whether a provider of a residential social care service is: safe, effective, caring, 
responsive to ƉĞŽƉůĞ ?ƐŶĞĞĚƐ ?ĂŶĚǁĞůů-led. Inspections focus on key lines of enquiry (KLOEs) that are used 
to consistently assess the five key questions. Care homes are given an overall rating of outstanding, good, 
requires improvement, or inadequate, and are also rated for each of the five questions using the same 
scale (Care Quality Commission, 2016). The CQC has significant enforcement powers, which range from 
requirement notices through to criminal prosecution (Care Quality Commission, 2015a). Any care homes 
rated as inadequate overall will ordinarily be in breach of regulations and will be placed in to special 
measures immediately. The home will be monitored closely and re-inspected after six months; if the home 
shows no significant improvement then the CQC will begin the process to prevent the provider operating 
the home, i.e. close the care home (Care Quality Commission, 2016).   
 
3. Conceptual framework 
For care homes there is both a fixed and variable cost element to quality. At a fixed cost-level, increased 
quality can be achieved at higher fixed costs, e.g. purpose built care homes (Forder and Allan, 2014). Labour 
ĐŽƐƚƐĨŽƌŵƚŚĞůĂƌŐĞƐƚƉĂƌƚŽĨǀĂƌŝĂďůĞĐŽƐƚƐ ?>ĂŝŶŐ ?ƵŝƐƐŽŶ ?Ɛ ‘&ĂŝƌƉƌŝĐĞŽĨĐĂƌĞ ?ŵŽĚĞůĨŽƌĂĐĂƌĞŚŽŵĞ
suggests that labour costs would account for 49% and 57% of a fair price for a place in a private, non-
London, residential and nursing home, respectively (Laing & Buisson, 2014). Wages have not increased 
greatly over time in social care but the introduction of the National Living Wage (NLW) in April 2016 (£7.20 
per hour) may have increased the share of labour costs in total costs significantly. Indeed, before the 
introduction of the NLW, almost 70% of care workers aged 25 and over employed by care homes were paid 
below that rate (see Vadean and Allan, forthcoming).  
Standard economic theory suggests a positive, exponential, relationship between quality and costs. To 
increase quality, costs must also increase, and to achieve ever higher quality costs must increase at a higher 
rate (e.g. Mussa and Rosen, 1978; Donabedian et al., 1982; Brekke et al., 2010). Mukamel and Spector 
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(2000) found a U-shaped relationship in New York state nursing homes between quality and costs 
suggesting that high quality could also be achieved at low cost, by using innovative care protocols and/or 
management strategies. Nonetheless, other things equal, the more expenditure on care the higher should 
be the expected quality.   
The definition of quality in care homes can generally be separated in to two distinct elements: quality of 
care and quality of life (Osborne, 1992). The former are the technical aspects of care for which the care 
home is looking after the resident (Wiener, 2003; Malley and Fernandez, 2010; Spilsbury et al., 2011). The 
latter is individual-based anĚŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƌŶĞĚǁŝƚŚƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚƐ ?ƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚůŝĨĞ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƚŚĞŝƌůĞǀĞůŽĨ
control, privacy, interactions, safety, ability to achieve the activities of daily living, etc. (Wiener et al., 2007; 
Malley and Fernandez, 2010; OECD/European Commission, 2013). Quality of care will be directly influenced 
by the competency and quality of care home staff, and, whilst more subjective in nature, quality of life will 
be indirectly influenced by care home staff. Staff and staffing characteristics in long-term care have an 
impact on satisfaction (Chou et al., 2003; Lucas et al., 2007) and perceived quality of service (Netten et al., 
2007). 
The measurement of care quality provided focuses on structure, process and outcome (Donabedian, 1988). 
The structure of the home includes its characteristics (e.g. size, staff mix) and the characteristics of the 
residents (payer-type mix). Process refers to the delivery of care, whilst outcome is the result of the care 
process, in terms of both health outcomes and satisfaction. Staffing is likely to affect all three of these 
elements. For example, given care homes have to meet the fundamental standards of care and safety, 
staffing decisions are likely to be part of the structural decision making of the quality set-up of the care 
home. Issues around maintaining staffing levels, vacancies, turnover, retention and the mix of staff are an 
indicator of the process of the care home. And, as outlined above, staffing issues will inevitably affect 
outcomes, and quite possibly vice versa. Lower staffing levels compared to the ideal will mean that the 
quality of care delivered will suffer. Poor quality care may also drive further staff to leave.  A large number 
of new staff may also negatively affect how service is delivered in a care home due to lack of, in economic 
parlance, specific training. Staff are therefore likely to have a large bearing on the quality of care received 
in care homes. In this analysis, we focus on the following five factors of workforce composition: 1) staffing 
levels; 2) vacancy rates; 3) turnover rates/retention rates; 4) share of temporary staff; and 5) nursing ratios 
(in nursing homes). 
Overall staffing levels 
An adequate number of staff will be required to perform all necessary tasks within a care home. As 
described earlier, there is no mandated minimum staffing level and England has large differences in nursing 
levels and standards for care homes compared to other countries (Harrington et al., 2012). There have 
been calls for national guidance on staffing levels and ratios (Royal College of Nursing, 2012). 
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The empirical evidence generally points to increased nursing staff improving quality outcomes. Cawley et 
al. (2006) examined factor substitution in US nursing homes and found that higher wages resulted in fewer 
staff being employed, increased use of medication, and poorer outcomes. Zhang et al. (2008) find that the 
increased employment of social service and mental health services staff significantly reduced deficiency 
citations for psychosocial care. However, there are studies that have found no link between staffing levels 
and quality (e.g. Rantz et al., 2004; Flynn et al., 2010). 
The a priori expectations on staffing levels will depend on the motives of care home owners. Non-profit 
care homes should employ a level of staff to maximise the quality of the service, the level of which will 
depend on the size of the home, and the demographics of the population they serve (needs levels, etc.). 
For-profit care homes may consider maximising profit, subject to an adequate level of quality to remain in 
ďƵƐŝŶĞƐƐ ?ůůĂŶĂŶĚ&ŽƌĚĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŵĂŶǇ ‘ĨŽƌ-ƉƌŽĨŝƚ ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌƐ ?ƉĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƌůǇƐŝŶŐůĞŚŽŵĞŽƌƐŵĂůů
multi-home organisations, can be regarded as having some non-profit motivation (Matosevic et al., 2000; 
Knapp et al., 2001; Netten et al., 2001; Kendall et al., 2003).1 Nonetheless, subject to diminishing marginal 
returns, the greater the level of staff the higher will be the quality provided. 
Hypothesis H1: Increased staffing will improve quality, but at a decreasing rate: ݍᇱሺݏሻ ൐  ? and ݍᇱᇱሺݏሻ ൏  ?. 
Vacancy rates 
Vacancy rates are very high in social care (Skills for Care, 2016), and are much higher than national averages 
(Hussein et al., 2016). There is little empirical evidence as to how vacancy rates impact on the quality of 
care received in care homes. Chester et al. (2014) examined the influence of commissioning and 
contracting arrangements on staff turnover and vacancies in social care at the local authority-level in the 
UK. Also pertinent to vacancies is the economic literature of skills shortages (Green et al., 1998). Any 
shortage of skills identified by firms will inevitably mean that either there is a gap in the workforce, or a 
lower-skilled, and less productive, employee is fulfilling the role. There is evidence of a significant negative 
impact of skills shortages on productivity (Haskell and Martin, 1993). Shortages of staff are also play an 
important role for care home closures in the UK (Netten et al., 2003). Therefore, we proceed with the 
expectation that vacancies in care homes are likely to increase pressure on existing members of staff, which 
could lead to lower care quality provision.  
Hypothesis H2: Increased vacancy rates will lower quality: ݍᇱሺݒሻ ൏  ?. 
                                                          
1 McDonald et al. (2013) find that US for-profit nursing homes were no more likely to receive deficiency citations for 





Relationships form a key part of care home life (Brown Wilson et al., 2009). We would therefore expect 
retention and turnover of staff to have opposite effects on care home quality. Retention of staff is 
important so as to maintain the carer-resident relationship, whereas a high turnover of staff will lead to a 
breakdown of this care continuity. Additionally, a good retention of staff will also suggest a good quality 
employer with room for progression or at least fulfilment in roles, high turnover of staff the opposite. 
There is evidence that staffing stability will impact on care home quality. The Royal College of Nursing 
(2012) reported that a high level of turnover can lead to an inappropriate skill mix in care homes. Low et al. 
(2015) found that high workload and high employee turnover negatively impacts on staff attitudes towards 
quality. Eaton (2000) finds descriptive evidence of high turnover being linked to low quality care from 
observatory fieldwork and case studies of 20 nursing homes in California and Pennsylvania. Finally, Chou et 
al. (2003) use structural equation modelling to find that resident satisfaction in Australian nursing homes 
and hostels (residential care) was significantly improved by staff satisfaction levels, the effect being 
stronger in the former homes. Staff satisfaction and employee turnover have been found to be inversely 
related (Cotton and Tuttle, 1986; Clark, 2001). 
Both turnover and retention are included as it could be possible that they do not capture the same 
elements of staff stability. For example, a provider with high retention of staff may nonetheless have a high 
turnover resulting from consistent movement of staff in a few job roles (e.g. Barry et al., 2005).   
Hypothesis H3: A high retention of staff will improve quality: ݍᇱሺݎሻ ൐  ?Ǥ 
Hypothesis H4: A high level of staff turnover will decrease quality: ݍᇱሺݐሻ ൏  ?.  
Temporary workforce rates 
Closely linked to turnover and vacancies is the use of temporary staff, and particularly agency staff. If 
temporary staff are being employed then they are likely filling a gap in the staffing of a care home that 
could not readily be filled. A greater number of staff should therefore improve quality. However, the use of 
temporary staff may also have negative connotations. Residents may not know the people they are 
engaging with in their own (care) home. If agency staff are behaving more pragmatically in their role, 
concentrating on the task at hand rather than focusing on the relationship, then this could impact on the 
ƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƐĞǆƉĞƌŝĞŶĐĞ ?ƌŽǁŶtŝůƐŽŶĂŶĚĂǀŝĞƐ ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĐĂƌĞŚŽŵĞŵĂǇƐƉĞĐŝĨŝĐĂůůǇĚĞĐŝĚĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚƵƐŝŶŐ
temporary staff for this reason, but this in turn may place greater pressure on existing staff (e.g. Royal 
College of Nursing, 2012).  
The use of agency staff has been investigated in the US. Xue et al. (2012) descriptively examined differences 
between agency (and temporary) nurses and permanently employed nurses and found that the proportion 
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of agency and temporary nurse working in long term health settings, including nursing homes, fell over 
time. Bourbonniere et al. (2006) show descriptively that nursing homes employing a greater than 5% level 
of contract nursing staff, which include, but are not solely, agency staff, were much more likely to have high 
levels of deficiency citations indicating lower quality..  
Castle and Engberg (2008a) found that agency staff had significant negative effects on measures of quality, 
including increased physical restraint use, but that for agency registered nurses there were both positive 
and negative impacts on quality measures. Indeed, Castle and Engberg (2008b) took this further and found 
that the employment of agency registered nurses improved a single quality variable statistically generated 
from 14 measures of quality in 1,071 US nursing homes. Employing agency licensed practice nurses or 
nursing assistants did not improve quality, but they also found significant interaction effects including a 
positive one between regular registered nursing employees and agency nursing assistants.  
We therefore proceed with the tentative expectation that the prevalence of temporary staff employed by a 
care home will negatively impact on quality. 
Hypothesis H6: The higher the proportion of temporary staff in a care home the lower the quality: ݍᇱሺܽሻ ൏ ?. 
Nursing ratios 
Generally, there is a positive relationship between the employment of nursing staff and care home quality 
(Dellefield et al., 2015). For example, Konetzka et al. (2008) use data on nursing homes from 5 US states 
before and after the introduction of a prospective payment system to estimate the impact of registered 
nurse staffing and skill mix on two (negative) measures of outcome, urinary tract infections (UTIs) and 
pressure sores. Their results suggest that the amount of registered nurse hours has a negative effect on the 
level of UTIs and pressure sores, and that higher skill mix only has a significant negative impact on UTIs. 
There is also evidence that a lack of registered nursing staff leads to increased hospitilisation rates (e.g. 
Kayser-Jones et al., 1989; Carter & Porell, 2003). We therefore expect that the higher the prevalence of 
registered nursing staff in a care home, the higher will be the quality. 




4. Data and methodology 
Data 
We use the National Minimum Dataset for Social Care (NMDS-SC) as of April 2016. The NMDS-SC is an 
online database of the adult social care workforce for England, and is used as the main source of workforce 
intelligence by the Government and LAs. The NMDS-SC is managed by Skills for Care on behalf of the 
Department of Health. Data kept on the NMDS-SC is maintained by providers who voluntarily register. Each 
worker entered on to the NMDS-SC is provided with a unique identification number so that they cannot be 
identified. Skills for Care offer free advice and support to providers via phone and online, and the use of the 
NMDS-SC comes with a number of benefits including: personalised reports, planning workforce decisions, 
track staffing, compare to local and regional providers, apply for funding for training, and access to online 
training modules. In addition, provider data held on the NMDS-SC can automatically be used to update the 
staffing section of their Provider Information Return (PIR), which is a legally required document as part of 
the inspection and monitoring process for all social care providers regulated by the CQC (Care Quality 
Commission, 2015c). 
NMDS-SC is the only nationwide source of social care staffing data. However, there are weaknesses to this 
data. First, data is provided voluntarily and so not all providers will be involved. Nonetheless, the NMDS-SC 
has information on a large proportion of social care establishments, more than 22,000 out of an estimated 
39,500 establishments across the country (Skills for Care, 2015). Second, the data provided is from the 
provider, and so it is not validated as to its reliability. However, as stated above data held on the NMDS-SC 
can be used to complete a section oĨĂƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƌ ?ƐW/Z ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞĚĂƚĂŚĞůĚĐĂŶďĞƵƐĞĚďǇƚŚĞYƚŽŝŶĨŽƌŵ
inspectors as part of their intelligent monitoring process if a provider allows for this. The large majority 
(83%) of providers with data on the NMDS-SC allow their data to be used by the CQC.2 
Skills for Care provided an anonymised provider database for April 2015 and April 2016, the latter with CQC 
quality ratings matched to providers (where they had been rated). The April 2016 provider database has 
22,088 providers across all forms of social care. Of these 5,083 were independent sector care homes where 
at least some of the residents were older people or older people suffering with dementia. However, not all 
of the entries are kept current. As such, we restricted the analysis to those establishments that had entered 
data in the last calendar year up to April 2016, leaving 3,496 care homes (68.78%). The analysis uses  time-
lagged values of staffing characteristics as appropriate instruments and so requires a care home to have 
updated their information in the calendar year to April 2015 to be included. This leaves 2,516 care homes 





for the analysis. As well as information on staffing levels, the dataset has information on the type of care 
home (nursing or residential), the sector (private or voluntary), the region where the care home is located 
in England, and number of beds. 
The measures of staffing characteristics are as follows. Total staff is the total number of permanent and 
temporary staff employed at the establishment. The vacancy rate is calculated as the total number of 
vacancies to the total number of staff. The turnover rate is calculated as the total number of staff who left 
the establishment to the total number of staff 12 months earlier, and similarly the retention rate is the 
total number of staff retained at the establishment in the last 12 months to the total number of staff 12 
months earlier. The rate of temporary, pool and agency staff is calculated as the number of direct care staff 
that are either pool, agency, or on temporary contracts to the total number of direct care staff. The nursing 
ratio for nursing homes is calculated as the rate of registered nurses to the total of non-management staff.  
Local area characteristics were matched to the dataset using geographical identifiers held in the database. 
Specifically, measures of need, demand and supply were matched to providers at LA-level (n=152) and 
postcode district-level (n=2,302), which is the lowest level of geography available.3 For need and demand 
the percentage of people who provided unpaid care, the percentage of people reporting their health as bad 
(both from 2011 census data), the percentage receiving pension credit and the percentage receiving 
Disability Living Allowance (DLA) were used, all at the postcode district level.4 At supply level, the 
ƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞŽĨĨĞŵĂůĞƐƌĞĐĞŝǀŝŶŐũŽďƐĞĞŬĞƌƐ ?ĂůůŽǁĂŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞŶƚĂŐĞŽĨĨĞŵĂůĞƐǁŝƚŚŶŽƋƵĂůŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?
both at postcode district level, and LA-level average house price were used. In addition, a measure of 
competition at the postcode district level was also included. This is a Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
measure of competition for every care home for the elderly in the CQC register of care homes for April 
2016, measured using a 10km radius around the home following the method of Forder and Allan (2014), 
where 0 indicates perfect competition and 1 indicates monopoly. The postcode-district average of the HHI 
for each care home was matched to the final dataset.  
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 1. Staff-wise, the average elderly care home has a staff of 47 
people with an average size of 40 beds. Vacancy rates are higher than the national average. The average 
turnover rate of 26% and retention rate of 75.5% shows that care homes have trouble retaining staff. 
Despite this, there is still only a small percentage of pool, agency and temporary workers employed. Finally, 
for nursing homes around 1 in every 7 non-management staff are registered nurses on average.   
                                                          
3 For anonymity reasons, the full postcode was not available. The postcode district is the first half of a full postcode 
(e.g. SW1). 
4 Pension credit is an income-based benefit available for those who qualify for the state pension and Disability Living 
Allowance is a benefit for adults that need help with mobility or care costs. 
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As might be expected, the voluntary sector is slightly over-represented and the nursing sector is under-
represented. The current CQC quality rating system began in October 2014 and by April 2016 1,675 of the 
2,516 care homes had been rated. Of these, around two thirds were classed as good or outstanding. 
<Table 1 about here> 
Multiple Imputation 
Because of the large number of homes that have yet to be rated by the CQC, and given there is some high 
levels of missing staffing characteristics data, we assume that the data are missing at random and use 
multiple imputation (MI) to give predicted values for the homes with data missing. To generate 20 
imputations, we implemented a chained imputation method with logit and predictive mean matching 
models.  
Model 
We can assume that for all care homes in England there is an underlying latent quality variable, ܳכ, which 
indicates the propensity that a care home will be rated as good or excellent following a CQC inspection. 
This can be described by the following:  ܳ௜௝כ ൌ ߙ௜௝ ൅ ߚ ௜ܵ௝ ൅ ߜ ௜ܺ௝ ൅ ߝ௜௝  
The quality of care home i in postcode district j is dependent on a vector of staffing characteristics, ܵ, a 
vector of care home- and local-level need, demand and supply measures, ܺ, and a random error term, ߝ. 
The relationship between ܳכ and ݍ, the observed CQC quality rating, is explained in the following way:  ݍ ൌ  ?݂݅ ܳ௜௝כ ൐  ? ݍ ൌ  ?݂݅ ܳ௜௝כ ൑  ? 
Where ݍ takes a value of 1 for homes that are rated as good or excellent and a value of 0 for homes rated 
as inadequate or requires improvement. 
It is likely that both competition and staff characteristics are endogenous to quality ratings, be it an omitted 
variable bias or simultaneity between quality ratings and competition/staff characteristic. For example, 
Castle (2013) finds that nursing homes where staff were consistently assigned to the same care recipient 
have lower turnover and absenteeism, and Bowblis (2011) shows that state federally mandated minimum 
staffing levels led to higher levels of staff and higher quality. As an example of simultaneity, Hayes et al. 
(2012) find that nurse turnover was impacted by the quality of care provided. As such, the estimation 
procedure used is a two-stage probit model of the binary measure of quality. In the first stage instruments 
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are included in a regression of the endogenous independent variable, and then the predicted value of the 
endogenous variable is included in the second stage probit regression of quality. 
We use spatial- and time-lag instruments to control for potential endogeneity. For the staff measures, we 
use the (one year) lagged value of each staffing measure combined with a higher-level geography measure 
of local employment conditions  W ƚŚĞƉĞƌĐĞŶƚŽĨǁŽŵĞŶĐůĂŝŵŝŶŐũŽďƐĞĞŬĞƌƐ ?ĂůůŽǁĂŶĐĞ ?:^ ?Ăƚ>-level. 
For competition the instruments used follow that of Forder and Allan (2014), which are measures of need 
and demand at higher level geographies  W the percent of older people (65+) claiming pension credit and the 
percent of the population claiming Disability Living Allowance (DLA), both at LA level. All spatial instruments 
exclude the values from the lower level geography that the care home is located in, i.e. postcode district, 
and the postcode district-level measures are included in both stages of the regression analysis. 
 
5. Results  
The approach for testing the adequacy and use of the instruments given the use of multiple imputation 
follows that outlined in Allan and Forder (2015). Briefly, weak instruments are assessed using an MI F-test 
of the instruments when included in a regression of staffing characteristics and competition with all 
independent variables also included. Residuals from these first stage regressions were included in probit 
regressions of quality ratings and the significance of the residuals was used to test for endogeneity. Finally, 
over-identification was assessed by including the instruments in a regression of the residuals from the 
second stage and using MI F-tests to assess the significance of the instruments. All instruments passed MI 
F-tests in the first stage regressions and there was also no indication of overidentification for any of the 
instruments. However, whilst there was no sign of endogeneity for competition or any of the other staffing 
variables, there is an indication that both vacancy rate and nursing ratio were endogenous variables (the 
former at 10% significance level).  
Table 2 reports in the first column the results of a basic MI probit model, in the second column a MI probit 
model where vacancy rate is instrumented to control for endogeneity and the final column presents a MI 
probit model for nursing homes only where both vacancy rates and nursing ratio are instrumented.5 As 
found in previous analyses, competition reduces quality in care homes, voluntary care homes have 
significantly higher quality, and nursing homes significantly lower quality. The size of the home does not 
impact on the quality rating. For staffing characteristics, the results suggest that overall staff size does not 
significantly impact on care home quality. Vacancy rates and retention rates have a significant effect on 
                                                          
5 The results of the first stage regressions for each potential endogenous variable are presented in the appendix. 
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care home quality, in the expected directions. Turnover rates and the level of pool, agency and temporary 
staff have no significant impact on care home quality. When looking at only nursing homes in Table 3 the 
results suggest that the level of registered nurses does not have a significant positive effect on care home 
quality.   
<Table 2 about here> 
The marginal effects of staffing characteristics on quality are presented in Table 3 for the three models of 
Table 2. Looking at the preferred results where vacancy rates are instrumented, a one percentage point 
increase in vacancy rate and retention rate would lead to a 1.6% decrease and a 0.3% increase in the 
probability of the average care home being rated as good or excellent, respectively. For nursing homes, the 
effect of vacancy rates on quality ratings is even stronger.  
We perform a number of specification checks. First, we run the probit analysis on the complete cases. 
Second, a multiple imputation probit regression is run for all care homes that updated information held on 
the NMDS-SC in the calendar year to April 2016 (n=3,496). Third, some care homes were rated prior to 
when their staffing data was updated on NMDS-SC. To confirm that this does not affect the results, we run 
the analysis only for care homes that were rated by the CQC after their staffing characteristics had been 
updated. Only in the latter do the results differ from the main analysis, with retention rate no longer 
significantly affecting quality rating. Finally, for pool, agency and temporary workers a binary variable 
indicating a high level of these staff (greater than 5%) was also not significant.   
<Table 3 about here> 
 
6. Discussion 
The findings suggest that local workforce characteristics do have a significant impact on quality. In 
particular, vacancies and levels of retention impact on the probability of a care home being rated as good 
or excellent from CQC inspections. Having vacancies in a care home will mean increased working pressure 
for existing staff and dilutes the amount of effort an individual staff member can give to any resident. This 
result fits with the findings of the Royal College of Nursing (2012) report of a survey of registered nurses 
which found that many felt they could not adequately deliver the quality they wanted to in their role 
because of staff shortages. Higher retention rates will mean better quality is delivered, and has a stronger 
(absolute) effect on quality than turnover rates. This finding is suggestive that tenure at a care home is 
important, that there is job-specific training and knowledge which is pertinent to how successful care home 
staff are in delivering high quality outcomes for residents. Continuity of caregivers for residents is 
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undoubtedly important, but perhaps less so in determining care home quality given that turnover rates do 
not have such a significant impact on quality ratings. 
There was no significant impact on quality of the prevalence of temporary staff. The use of pool and agency 
staff is fairly low in care homes and is much higher in other parts of social care. Nonetheless, this finding, 
combined with that of vacancy rates, suggests that having the correct level of staffing is very important for 
care homes. It would also suggest that care home providers are good at training their short-term staff.    
The marginal effects found were not large in an absolute sense. However, this masks that care homes that 
have large changes to their staffing circumstances could find their quality affected to a great extent. For 
instance, the average care home having an increase in vacancy rate from the mean level to the 90th 
percentile level (8.0%), equivalent to 2.6 extra vacancies each year at mean staffing levels, would have a 
9.1% decrease in the probability of being rated as good or excellent. Similarly, a care home that was able to 
improve their retention rate from the 10th percentile level (46.0%) to the mean level, equivalent to 13 extra 
staff members being retained, would be 9.9% more likely to be rated as good or excellent.  
There has been no previous quantitative results for England as to the impact that staffing has on care home 
quality and so this is an important finding for policy. Care providers are currently facing both income 
pressures as a result of the continued climate of public sector spending reductions and cost pressures due 
to the introduction of the new National Living Wage. These pressures may push care home providers to 
employ a bare minimum level of staffing. For example, US evidence shows that cuts to reimbursement 
payments resulted in fewer staff (e.g. Konetzka et al., 2004; Unruh et al., 2006). Low wages, and a stressful 
working environment with too few staff, would further reduce incentives for staff to remain with a 
provider, or even within the industry when alternative low-wage, but lower pressure, jobs are usually 
available, e.g. retail industry. A four-year national retention and recruitment strategy for social care was 
implemented in 2014 (Skills for Care, 2014). The results of this paper suggest that a continuation of this 
policy would be highly beneficial.  
Currently a large proportion of care home staff come from overseas. In 2016 7% of social care staff were 
from the EU and 11% were from outside the EU, and this varies by region to a large extent (Skills for Care, 
2016).6 There are therefore concerns about the impact on care home staffing of the decision by the UK to 
leave the EU given a large proportion of staff are of EU nationality (e.g. McKenna, 2016). Additionally, 
changes to immigration laws have made it difficult for low-paid immigrants to be granted indefinite leave 
                                                          





to remain in the UK (e.g. Allan, 2015).7 All of these issues point to increased pressures in recruiting and 
retaining staff. Therefore, policy to help encourage longevity in post would be useful in promoting a 
stronger, higher quality, care homes market. 
A number of specification checks were performed but there are still some caveats to the findings. First, the 
results are based on a cross-section and only confirm a correlation between quality and workforce 
characteristics. Any causation would have to be examined using a longitudinal analysis. Second, the results 
use data that is provided by the care homes themselves. The quality of this data cannot therefore be 
assessed, but we argue to its veracity. Third, care home quality has been measured using CQC quality 
ratings, and so these may not reflect individual resident outcomes within care homes. However, previous 
CQC star ratings have been found to be positively related to social care related quality of life (Netten et al., 
 ? ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƵŶĚĞƌůǇŝŶŐďĂƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞĐƵƌƌĞŶƚYƋƵĂůŝƚǇƌĂƚŝŶŐƐǇƐƚĞŵŝƐƚŚĞ ‘DƵŵdĞƐƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂƐŬƐ if 
someone would be happy with the services provided if their mother lived in the care home.8 Therefore, it 
seems likely that CQC quality ratings will reflect individual outcomes, at least to some extent.  
Finally, the instruments for the staffing variables were taken from earlier data. Some pause may be 
required since it has been shown that there are issues with using time-lags as instruments (Bellemare et al., 
2015; Reed, 2015). Future research in this area may need to consider alternative instruments, but, even so, 













                                                          
7 Although note that nurse is an occupation currently on the shortage occupation list and so this does not apply. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Variable n missingness mean s.d. min max 
Quality rating 1675 33.43 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Care home level - staff 
      
Total staff 2516 0.00 46.92 29.34 1 339 
Vacancy rate 1481 41.14 2.47 5.04 0.00 34.55 
Turnover rate 1797 28.58 25.90 21.02 0.00 78.79 
Retention rate 1540 38.79 75.51 20.03 13.51 100.00 
Care staff temp/agency/pool % 2456 2.38 5.31 9.32 0.00 48.28 
Nursing staff % (NH only) 757 11.05 14.08 5.60 1.02 34.48 
Care home level - other 
      
Nursing 2516 0.00 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Voluntary 2516 0.00 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Beds 2516 0.00 40.25 22.76 1.00 236.00 
Postcode level 
      
Competition (HHI) 2510 0.24 0.06 0.08 0.01 1.00 
Female JSA % 2516 0.00 0.94 0.67 0.00 4.74 
Female no quals % 2516 0.00 25.87 6.37 5.58 46.80 
Pension Credit % 2516 0.00 17.77 8.39 0.64 66.25 
DLA % 2516 0.00 4.67 1.90 0.17 12.73 
Health bad % 2516 0.00 5.73 1.70 2.16 12.35 
Activity limited a lot % 2516 0.00 8.31 2.28 2.92 17.70 
Average house price 2516 0.00 259293 183995 54997 4819745 
Population 65+ 2516 0.00 6000 2878 242 16847 
Instruments       
Vacancy rate  W Apr 2015  1543 38.67 2.94 6.05 0.00 38.46 
Turnover rate  W Apr 2015 1712 31.96 23.67 18.24 0.00 66.66 
Retention rate  W Apr 2015 1488 40.86 76.34 19.39 14.29 100.00 
Temp agency pool % - Apr 2015 2475 1.63 6.24 11.78 0.00 47.37 
Nursing staff % (NH only)  W Apr 2015 809 4.94 14.48 5.30 1.75 25.93 
Female JSA % - LA 2516 0.00 0.97 0.49 0.27 3.01 
Pension Credit % - LA 2516 0.00 17.27 6.31 5.74 52.00 
DLA % - LA 2516 0.00 4.63 1.35 1.69 10.29 




Table 2: Results 
Notes: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. NS indicates not significant. 
Regions: North East, North West, Yorkshire & Humberside, East Midlands, West Midlands, East England, London 








 Probit IV probit IV probit ʹ NHs only 
 Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. 
Care home - staffing characteristics    
Vacancy rate -0.020*** 0.008 -0.044*** 0.015 -0.058*** 0.019 
Turnover rate 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004 0.002 0.006 
Retention rate 0.009*** 0.003 0.009*** 0.003 0.007 0.005 
Pool Agency Temp ratio 0.001 0.004 0.002 0.004 0.003 0.005 
Nursing ratio     -0.007 0.015 
Total staff 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.004 
Total staff squared 2.6e-6 1.2e-5 5.1e-6 1.2e-5 5.3e-6 1.4e-5 
Care home level - other     
Total beds -0.004 0.004 -0.003 0.004 -0.0002 0.006 
Total beds squared -6.7e-6 2.7e-5 -1.1e-5 2.7e-5 -4.5e-5 4.4e-5  
Nursing home -0.248*** 0.076 -0.208** 0.079   
Voluntary 0.346*** 0.109 0.359*** 0.110 0.475** 0.222 
Postcode district level     
Competition (HHI) 0.166*** 0.047 0.164*** 0.047 0.283*** 0.075 
Female JSA % 0.145 0.100 0.140 0.099 0.102 0.175 
Female no quals % -0.008 0.014 -0.007 0.014 0.003 0.023 
Pension credit % -0.009 0.010 -0.008 0.010 -0.005 0.015 
DLA % -0.048 0.053 -0.051 0.053 -0.147 0.093 
Health bad % 0.007 0.119 0.009 0.121 0.122 0.184 
Activity limited a lot % 0.034 0.085 0.030 0.086 -0.032 0.128 
Avg. house price (log) -0.146 0.149 -0.120 0.150 -0.084 0.268 
Population 65+ (log) 0.030 0.081 0.029 0.081 0.077 0.125 
Regions YES YES YES 
Constant 2.295 2.156 2.004 2.172 1.443 3.901 
n 2516 2516 851 
Imputations 20 20 20 
Average RVI 0.456 0.7252 0.380 
Largest FMI 0.595 0.7832 0.618 
   Statistic Prob. Statistic Prob. 
Weak instruments (vacancy rate)   35.82*** <0.001 35.82*** <0.001 
Weak instruments (nursing ratio)     201.97*** <0.001 
Over-ID (vacancy rate)   0.02NS 0.981 0.02NS 0.981 
Over-ID (nursing ratio)     0.11NS 0.893 
Endogeneity (vacancy rate)   1.72* 0.091 1.72* 0.091 
Endogeneity (nursing ratio)     2.63** 0.010 




Table 3: Marginal effects 
 Probit IV probit IV probit (NHs only) 
Staffing measure Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. 
Vacancy rate -0.0073*** 0.0027 -0.0158*** 0.0053 -0.022*** 0.0073 
Turnover rate 0.0014 0.0013 0.0017 0.0013 0.0007  
Retention rate 0.0032*** 0.0012 0.0032*** 0.0012 0.0028 0.0019 
Pool Agency Temp ratio 0.0004 0.0013 0.0008 0.0013 0.0012 0.0019 
Registered nurse ratio 
  

























Table A1: First stage regression models (IV probit) for each potential endogenous variable 
Notes: All models include regions and a constant (not presented). Predicted competition (i.e. instrumented) is used in all models as a dependent variable See notes for table 2.  
 Competition Vacancy rate Turnover rate Retention rate Pool Agcy. Temp Ratio Nursing ratio 
 Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err 
Care home staffing characteristics            
Vacancy rate   -0.046*** 0.015         
Turnover rate     -0.007 0.006       
Retention rate       0.009 0.006     
Pool Agency Temp ratio        -0.0005 0.005   
Nursing ratio           -0.006 0.014 
Total staff 0.003 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
Total staff sq. -5.1e-7 1.2e-5 4.7e-6 1.2e-5 -5.3e-6 1.2e-5 1.0e-6 1.2e-5 -5.0e-7 1.2e-5 1.2e-6 1.4e-5 
Care home level ʹ other            
Total beds -0.005 0.004 -0.003 0.004 -0.004 0.004 -0.004 0.004 -0.005 0.004 0.001 0.006 
Total beds sq. -6.0e-6 2.7e-5 -1.4e-5 2.7e-5 -6.1e-6 2.7e-5 -3.6e-6 2.7e-5 -6.5e-6 2.6e-5 -5.1e-5 4.3e-5 
Nursing -0.299*** 0.074 -0.218*** 0.078 -0.270*** 0.078 -0.265*** 0.079 -0.298*** 0.074   
Voluntary 0.340*** 0.109 0.376*** 0.112 0.298** 0.114 0.318*** 0.110 0.342*** 0.113 0.566*** 0.210 
Postcode district level            
Pred. comp (HHI) 0.208 0.163 0.239 0.165 0.205 0.165 0.209 0.166 0.202 0.162 0.429 0.268 
Female JSA % 0.169 0.116 0.173 0.113 0.173 0.114 0.166 0.115 0.166 0.113 0.195 0.179 
Female no quals % -0.013 0.016 -0.013 0.016 -0.011 0.015 -0.010 0.015 -0.013 0.016 -0.015 0.026 
Pension credit % -0.008 0.010 -0.006 0.010 -0.008 0.010 -0.008 0.011 -0.008 0.010 0.007 0.016 
DLA % -0.053 0.062 -0.067 0.063 -0.059 0.062 -0.058 0.063 -0.052 0.062 -0.174 0.108 
Health bad % 0.042 0.146 0.059 0.151 -0.010 0.150 0.014 0.150 0.038 0.146 0.238 0.234 
Activity ltd. a lot % 0.027 0.086 0.018 0.088 0.044 0.089 0.039 0.088 0.029 0.086 -0.050 0.128 
Avg. house price (log) -0.157 0.148 0.103 0.149 -0.162 0.148 -0.159 0.148 -0.158 0.148 -0.093 0.271 
Population 65+ (log) 0.049 0.104 0.061 0.105 0.051 0.105 0.051 0.107 0.048 0.105 0.170 0.172 
n 2516 2516 2516 2516 2516 851 
Imputations 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Average RVI 0.177 0.652 0.486 0.481 0.216 0.320 
Largest FMI 0.371 0.792 0.659 0.575 0.467 0.445 
 Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. Stat. Prob. 
Weak instruments 54.78*** <0.001 35.82*** <0.001 79.52*** <0.001 55.47*** <0.001 347.86*** <0.001 201.97*** <0.001 
Over-ID 0.24NS 0.787 0.02NS 0.981 0.00NS 1.000 0.00NS 1.000 0.00NS 0.997 0.11NS 0.893 
Endogeneity -0.26NS 0.795 1.72* 0.091 0.63NS 0.530 -0.48NS 0.633 0.10NS 0.919 2.63** 0.010 
